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A B S T R A C T  
There is in society an increasing concern by corruption and its consequences. In these years 
of crisis, particularly in Spain, corruption has gone from being irrelevant to be one of the three 
main problems of the country. Despite of the abundant literature about this topic that it has 
been written, we are far from understanding the problem of corruption. This work tries to 
explain in a simple way the main characteristics of corruption and analyses how society 
modifies their perception of corruption depending on some factors.  A questionnaire was 
designed to focus on the sensitivity of individuals about corruption and bribing. Results show 
that our perception is affected by some personal characteristics. At the same time the 
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Corruption is not precisely a modern problem. In fact in every civilization around history we 
can observe corruption problems and revolutions caused by the incompetence of corrupt 
governments. From ancient Rome to the present cases of corruption of the leaders of FIFA 
(Fédération Internationale de Football Association), through the despot governments of 
European absolutist kings or historical behaviour of Catholic Church in the Vatican state, any 
country, state or organization in history has not been able to avoid the problem of corruption. 
Which is the first case of corruption documented in the history? It’s hard to know it, some 
historians date back to the time of Ramses IX (1100 B.C.), where a civil servant denounced 
in a document dirty business of another civil servant who had been associated with a gang of 
grave robbers. In the ancient Rome, Caton, the censor, suffered up to 44 corruption trials, 
general Escipion did burn evidence that accused his brother Lucio on a scam1. Along the 
years and civilizations, corruption has always been present, Luis XIV (absolutist king of 
France in the seventeenth century) said “Does not exist governor who does not commit any 
injustice, soldier who does not live dissolute way, lord of land which don't act as tyrant. Even 
the most honest civil servant is left corrupt, unable to go against”. Adam Smith admitted that 
“the commonly called a statesman or politician is a subject whose decisions are conditioned 
by personal interests." Even in the first European democracies didn’t avoid this bad habit, 
Winston Churchill said: “A corruption minimum serves as a beneficial lubricant for 
democracy”. 
Today, in Western countries, cases of corruption make tongues to wag, especially, as in 
Spain occur, important people or politicians are involved in them. However, when voting, do 
not always catch up with them. Despite the bad image of these rulers and the mass media 
noise, the impact on the citizens seems relative. Why? Afredo Alvar2 concludes that 
“Corruption mechanisms are universal but in Spain is celebrated as the Spanish picaresque 
heritage. Accepting corruption is a cultural construction and, unfortunately, in Spain stays up 
nice”. Antonio Argandoña3 believes that citizens are “schizophrenics and we have a double 
standard. We accept that in the world exists some form of corruption that basically we do not 
consider so bad. We tend to think that if to me, as an individual, it does no harm me; it's 
almost good if I move some money. The reasoning is: I am not concerned about corruption 
                                               
1
 “In ancient times, greasing the wheels was a habit as widespread as today and in some cases even 
considered lawful” Breve historia de la corrupcion: de la antigüedad a nuestros dias, (Brioschi, 2010) 
2
 Research professor of Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientificas (CSIC) and author of El 
Duque de Lerma, corrupción y desmoralización en la España del siglo XVII (Esfera de los libros). 
3
 Antonio Argandoña is Professor Emeritus of Economics and holder of the Chair "la Caixa" Social 




while it does not harm me personally. When a politician steals, we say that there is no right. 
But then we presume to have evaded income taxes”. Brisochi remembers that “next to the 
theft of the biggest there is always an unconscious corruption, for which we are responsible if 
we accept the rules of an illegal system because the micro corruption has always gone hand 
of macroscopic ones. 
To fight against corruption practises there are some international organizations that have as 
main objective to finish or to reduce this scourge. Nowadays, the Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) was an early advocate of putting more focus on 
fighting corruption, most notably because of its impact on fair competition in foreign trade. 
But following the OECD lead, other international organisations – such as the UN, the 
European Union, the World Bank and regional development banks – also made the fight 
against corruption a priority. 
The World Bank, in particular, has identified corruption as ‘The single greatest obstacle to 
economic and social development’ (World Bank, 2006a) and has taken the lead in promoting 
‘good governance’ as a key strategy to combat corruption. So in both multilateral and 
bilateral aid today, combatting corruption and establishing good governance are seen as 
necessary parts of supporting sustainable development (see, as examples, UK Commission 
for Africa, 2005; UK Government, 2000; USAID, 2003; World Bank, 2006b). We know that 
corruption is bad for society, but what can we consider as corruption? Is the corrupt 
behaviour condemned in all countries? How really does it influence on the development of 
the countries? Are corrupt people bad by nature? Do it exist any element or situation that 
facilitates or influence corrupt acts? There are too many questions that are still unclear. This 
paper tries to through some light in some of them. In the next sections it will be presented the 
main characteristics of corruption, how we can define it, its consequences and which are the 
causes that facilitate or provoke it. After that, it will be introduced the most useful tools to 
measure country levels of corruption and the problems that this measures have and also 
present you another method to research about corruption: the experimental analyses. In 
section 2 the survey will be presented, as well as the main characteristics, which are the 
motivations behind the survey and the hypothesis of the work. In section 3, the results of the 






What does corruption really mean? 
 
This is the first question to consider. What is corruption? And which practises does it 
involve?. It seems that it is an easy work but unfortunately we are far to find a clear and 
incontestable definition for corruption. We can follow the definition that Transparency 
International4 (TI) did in 2006:  
Corruption is operationally defined as the misuse of entrusted power for private gain. TI further 
differentiates between ‘according to rule’ corruption and ‘against the rule’ corruption. 
Facilitation payments, where a bribe is paid to receive preferential treatment for something 
that the bribe receiver is required to do by law, constitute the former. The latter, on the other 
hand, is a bribe paid to obtain services the bribe receiver is prohibited from providing 
(Transparency International, 2006) 
This definition may look straightforward and even unobjectionable, however closer 
consideration reveals some significant problems. TI’s definition explicitly refers to the 
payment of bribes, whereas many forms of corruption may not involve any form of financial 
transaction. It is precisely the fact that it is possible to refer to ‘many forms of’ corruption that 
immediately highlights one of the core difficulties we face. It cannot specify just one type of 
corruption, because is an extensive concept. In fact, recently TI has revised its definition.  
Generally speaking as “the abuse of entrusted power for private gain”. Corruption can be 
classified as grand, petty and political, depending on the amounts of money lost and the sector 
where it occurs. 
Grand corruption consists of acts committed at a high level of government that distort policies 
or the central functioning of the state, enabling leaders to benefit at the expense of the public 
good. Petty corruption refers to everyday abuse of entrusted power by low- and mid-level 
public officials in their interactions with ordinary citizens, who often are trying to access basic 
goods or services in places like hospitals, schools, police departments and other agencies. 
Political corruption is a manipulation of policies, institutions and rules of procedure in the 
allocation of resources and financing by political decision makers, who abuse their position to 
sustain their power, status and wealth. See animated definitions of many corruption terms in 
our Anti-corruption Glossary
5
. (Transparency International, 2016). 
 
                                               
4
 Transparency International is the best NGO know against corruption. Every year it publishes a 
corruption Index CPI, where countries are classified depending on their perception of corruption.  
5
 Transparency International, in its Anti-Corruption Glossary, identifies more than 50 types of 
corruption. http://www.transparency.org/glossary  In this sections appears both all types of corruptions 
and procedures to fight them. 
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Corruption needs more than a short definition to makes us understand the real meaning. 
Moreover, in terms of conception, there is another problem. The definition of corruption that 
TI or another organization, presents also an implicit cultural bias in the definition itself. 
Similarly, Ed Brown and Jonathan Cloke (2004, pág. 289) have argued that in international 
anti-corruption efforts, “‘There is frequently insufficient recognition of the complexities of even 
defining corruption in different political and cultural settings (and an increasing tendency towards the 
universalising of Western norms and values)’. 
Corruption is a complex system of behaviours and practices where there is no one form of 
corruption besides the way of understand corruption changes over countries and societies, 
hence for the same reasons there is no one best way of organize over states the fight 
against practices. It’s necessary to keep in mind this issue when it will be extracted 
conclusions of future researches. 
Causes and consequences of corruption  
 
The best researched issues among corruption are both the factors that produce corruption 
and the social-economic consequences of corruption. Since people had organized in 
socialites and the representative power became stronger, corruption appeared. We can read 
and learn different corruption situation in the ancient Rome or Egypt, all civilizations trough 
history suffer the same problem. Nowadays corruption is considered as one of the worst 
problems for development; in fact according to the latest barometer survey conducted by the 
Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas (CIS), 43.4% of the population identifies corruption 
and fraud as the second main problem in Spain6. Only the problem of unemployment is 
considered to be more serious, being identified by 80% of the population surveyed. The 
World Bank (2001) has identified corruption as ‘the single greatest obstacle to social and 
economic development. The harmful effects of corruption on countries’ economic 
development are widely acknowledged in the economic literature; using empirical 
approaches several authors show that corruption detracts investors, reduces the productivity 
of public expenditures, distorts the allocation of resources and thus lower economic growth. 
The problem of corruption is so harmful that even the biggest multinational organizations like 
World Bank, OECD or IMF among others, have made specific strategies against corruption.  
There are uncountable papers that try to find the economic consequences of corruption. In 
the seminal paper of Mauro (1995), the author tries to explain how corruption affects among 
different indicators of economic development. He found a negative association between 
                                               
6
 Findings from the CIS Barometer Survey (2016) corresponding to the multiple-response question in 
which respondents are asked to identify the three main problems currently affecting Spain. 
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corruption and investment, as well as growth; this is significant in both statistical and 
economic point of view. These relationships are robust in controlling for endogeneity by using 
an index of ethnolinguistic fractionalization as an instrument7. It is really common to use ELF 
as an instrument to correct endogeneity sources. Following Mauro’s work Axel Dreher and 
Thomas Herzfeld (2005), estimated the effect of corruption on economic growth and GDP 
per capita as well as six possible transmission channels. They use the same framework that 
Mauro used but extending the number of years and also other explanatory variables and 
indices. Calculating the direct and indirect effects of corruption from the regressions 
estimates, they estimated for each country the costs of being more corrupt than the average, 
these costs are indeed substantial. On the other hand these results have to be taken with 
extreme caution because the results substantially depend on the method of estimation. 
Corruption can undermine confidence in public institutions. There is empirical evidence for 
Spain that corruption has eroded citizen confidence in government (Sollé-Ollé & Navarro, 
2014). One of the basic principles underlying democracy is the assumption that governments 
are held accountable to their citizens at the ballot box. However, the lack of confidence in 
governments can lead to disaffection with the result that some citizens stop participating in 
the electoral process (Chong et al., 2011).  
To date, the characteristics of the institutional environment that promote corruption have yet 
to be identified. It is not possible, therefore, to propose a reform of the institutional framework 
to prevent corruption. However, as Javier Salinas recognizes there is a broad consensus that 
increased transparency is a good mechanism for preventing corruption. Increasing the 
information about the actions and decisions of the public sector to which citizens have 
access makes it more difficult for officials to engage in unlawful practices. Thus, in order  to 
prevent corruption it seems essential to increase the transparency of the actions of the public 
sector; to have an independent and effective judiciary system; and to have active and free 
media. As far as transparency is concerned, the measure generally adopted to bolster this is 
the legal regulation of the provision of information concerning the actions of government 
officials. An additional measure could be to use a local government’s history of accountability 
as a criterion for economic transfers from other tiers of government. 
                                               
7
 The ethno-linguistic fragmentation index (ELF) is calculated by Taylor and Hudson (Charles L. & 
Hudson, 1972) . It measures the probability that two randomly selected persons from given country will 
not belong to the same ethnolinguistic group. Therefore, the higher the ELF index, the more 
fragmented the country. The ELF is exogenous to both variables economic as politic variables. We 
assume that the rate with the countries are split ethnolinguistically is exogenous and unrelated to the 
economic variables other than through its effect on institutional efficiency.  












How can we measure corruption? 
 
Corruption is by nature a difficult reality to measure. It is a clandestine phenomenon, where 
information is scarce and objective data are not usually available. 
The availability of appropriate measures of corruption posed the main obstacle to empirical 
research, however, this changed substantially over the second half of the 90s. Basically, 
three different groups of corruption indices emerged: First, indices like those of the 
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) and Business International (BI) based on the 
assessment of country experts. The second group is derived from surveys among foreign or 
native businesspeople or the broad public. Examples are the indicators reported in the 1997 
World Development Report (WDR), by the World Economic Forum (WEF) and by the 
Institute for Management Development (IMD). The third and last group consists of so 
called ‘polls of polls’ and includes the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) of Transparency 
International and the Graft-index developed by the World Bank. Both indices are 
constructed using several corruption indicators with the aim of enlarging country 
coverage and reducing measurement error. The most used index to measure corruption 
is CPI, which has had a pivotal role in focusing attention on corruption, moreover CPI 
suppose a useful tool for researchers offering them a systematic basis on which to 
compare perceptions of corruption across a range of different countries year by year. 
“The CPI is a composite index, calculated using data sources from a variety of other 
institutions which seek to measure the overall extent of corruption in the public or political 
sector” (Transparency International). Transparency International has achieved a well-
known recognition around the world and its index is used for both researchers and 
politicians. Its value goes more far than the academic area, each autumn is generated 
widespread media interest across the world and contributes to promote international anti-
corruption initiatives.  
Despite of all its virtues we can not avoid its serious drawbacks, both in conception and 
in execution. Staffan Andersson and Paul M. Heywood (2009), (Davis & Ruhe, 2003), 
(Urra, 2007) and others, studied in more depth Transparency International index of 
corruption in order to highlight the deficiencies of the index and how it has been used for 
political ends which may not always turn out to be supportive of anti-corruption efforts. 
CPI presents some problems in conception due that impose our thought of corruption for 
the entire world, the definition of corruption and also the methods to measure have 
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implicit a cultural bias: the perception of one behaviour is corrupt or not, that varies 
country by country. To measure how intense is this effect James H. Davis and John A. Ruhe 
(Davis & Ruhe, 2003) examined the relationship between Hofstede’s cultural 
dimensions
8
 and how country corruption is perceived. They found that some cultural 
dimension explain a significant portion of the variance in perceived corruption. CPI 
measures perceptions rather than, for example, judicial procedures because judicial 
procedures could represent more a proxy of the proper functioning of the rule of law than 
a real proxy of corruption.  Another problem that CPI presents relates to the question of 
how we can properly interpret correctly what respondents to the various surveys 
understand about corruption. As CPI is a mix of surveys it is difficult to know if corruption 
represents the same for all surveys. Following with the problems of CPI we would like 
highlight the interval scales used by the index (0-100). It seems that CPI offers us an 
extremely accurate corruption measure, but in fact, as the same Transparency 
International explains, small variations in the index are not representative. Despite of the 
advice by Transparency International, several politicians and governments use in their 
favour small improvements both in the index and in the position of the rank. This misuse 
of the index does a disservice at the anticorruption work made by Transparency 
International.  
Even all the problems, CPI and the others corruption indices provide us a useful tool to 
compare different situations and also the progress of a country against corruption. It has 
to be careful when it proclaims solutions against corruption, as it has learned that there is 
not a unic form of corruption so there are multiple tools and politics to fight it, it must to 
study each singularity and act differently in every country or region.   
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 Hofstede’s Cultural Dimensions: Between 1967 and 1973, the engineer and social psychologist 
Geert Hofstede, made for IBM probably the most comprehensive study has been done to date about 
cultural paradigms (Hofstede, 1980). The study had a great impact in many areas and his theory has 
been widely used in several fields as a paradigm for research, particularly in cross-cultural psychology, 
international management, and cross-cultural communication. Hofstede analyzed 70 countries and 
simplified complex cultural patterns of conduct in five simple indicators. Although this study is 
somewhat outdated, the cultural dimensions are still fully valid and remain a widely used analysis tool. 
Dimensions of national cultures: Power distance; Uncertainty avoidance; Masculinity/Femininity; 
Individual/Collectivism; Long-term orientation vs. short-term orientation; Indulgence vs. restraint. (to 





Researchers have a really big problem to measure corruption due to inherent clandestine 
behaviour in this issue. The perception indices developed by the biggest international 
organizations to measure the corruption reality of each country present some problems, as 
we have already commented before. To fill this gap, a lot of experiments have been 
produced in order to find the real tendency of people to involve in corruption procedures. This 
method is really interesting to find which are the factors or conditions that contribute to 
corrupt behaviours. There are uncountable experiments about corruption. In these 
experiments, researchers try to find the factors that affect the corrupt behaviour of subjects. 
We suggest a classification in two big areas of research.  
One area of experiments studies the influence of environmental determinants in the corrupt 
behaviour finding in which situations corruption patterns are more likely to observe (Miller, 
2006; Jaber-López et al., 2015). Researchers make different experiments changing the 
norms of experiments with the same subjects in. An interesting study on this area is 
conducted by Jaber-López et al (2014), where besides to control the environment situations 
looks deeply the psychological patterns of people when face to unethical situations (referred 
to corruption). They conducted an experiment of asymmetric social dilemma where played an 
auctioneer and two bidders. Subjects of the experiment were controlled by researchers to 
obtain their stress levels (using skin conductance responses) in cases where they confront a 
bribe or corruption situation and they also control the response time. They changed the rules 
of the experiment making two different treatments to control other variables such as the 
existence of a possible punishment including an inspection. If there is not punishment pro-
social decisions remain residuals, but under the presence of an inspection pro-social option 
goes up to 54.55% despite the fact that inspection is only activated in the minority of cases. 
When they control the stress level of subjects, they found that higher arousal levels are 
associated with individual unprofitable choices not with bribe-giving or bribe taking choices.   
The other area of research using experiments about corruption tries to find which the 
personal determinants are to makes the people selfish or less cooperative (more likely to fall 
into corruption) (Frank & Schulze, 2000; Frank et al, 1993).  In the first area researchers 
make different experiments changing the norms of experiments with the same subjects in. 
The second area researchers make the same experiment with the same rules and 
concentrate their attention on the personal differences of subjects. Obviously some papers 
mix both areas of research using the same group of people where change the rules of the 
experiment and later show the results by personal differences and different treatments.  
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Despite the evident contribution of experimental analysis in order to explain corrupt 
behaviour, results and conclusions of the experiments are always questioned by the difficulty 
to extrapolate their results and conclusions from the experimental environment to real world9. 
Given that an experiment is a representation of the reality where researchers can isolate all 
the factors they want, control the procedure of subjects, write an specific rules into the 
experiment environment and specially subjects know that they are in an experimental area 
results, conclusions and recommendations obtained in experiments have to be taken 
carefully if we want transfer to real world. This is not a problem exclusively of experiments 
about corrupt behaviour, researchers have to deal with the problem of external validity in all 
experiments of what they do, whatever field.  
THE SURVEY 
 
Another method of studying corruption is through surveys. In fact, as we have said before, 
Transparency International periodically develops the CPI which is one of the most useful 
tools for studies on corruption. Surveys provide us the opportunity to ask directly to citizens, 
obtain first-hand information, obtaining larger samples than in the experiments, where 
citizens directly express their opinions, but it hardly can discern if that opinion is sincere or 
not. 
This work consists of a big simple over 400 surveys answered by internet. It was used the 
platform of google drive for surveys, which offer an easy interface to make a survey, useful 
ways to share it and an intuitive programme to control all the survey answered. It was 
obtained answers from the entire world, more than 20 different countries, but unfortunately 
the sample for the individual countries is not big enough to make a robust analysis. More 
than 300 surveys were received from Spain, being Valencia and Catalunya the regions with 
more response rate (Valencia represents more than 70% of the sample). The Survey was 
disseminated among contacts and they should send the survey to their contacts too. This 
procedure allows us to obtain a big sample in a few time, but presents two problems. The 
first one is that the sample is concentrated in one region due that it’s our residence and 
where we have the major number of contacts. The second problem is the background of the 
respondents. As a university student most of contacts have also university background so 
the percentage of people with university study is over the mean. In the sample over 55% 
have university studies while in the real world Spain has less 40% of university graduate 
(Ministerio de Educación Cultura y Deporte, 2016).   
                                               
9
 Rodrigo Moro and Esteban Freidin (2012) made a review about some experimental corruption 
studies and highlighted the external validity problem of these experiments. 
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Figure 1 shows the main personal characteristics of respondents, a more detailed description 
of variable is included in the Appendix 2. The response rate is much bigger in women than in 
men, in fact it is almost the double. We don’t know why this difference exists, maybe it’s just 
a random effect or maybe women are more liable to answer surveys than men. It would 
make more analysis about the answer rate of women and men in further studies. The 
number of unemployment people is lower than we can expect. The actual unemployment 
rate in Spain is over 20% while in the sample is less than 11%, we suppose that this 
difference is due to our specific contacts. The biggest unemployment rates are concentred in 
specific areas and regions and on the other hand students don’t compute as unemployment 
and a big part of our contacts are students.  
The survey is divided in 3 main parts. In the first part some personal data are asked like 
gender, age, nationality, etc. After they complete the first part, the real survey starts where it 
was collected all the information about of corruption perception by the respondent citizens. It 
is divided in two parts. In the part one we present some possible situations that respondents 
could see in their life, where they must respond on a scale from 0 (I'd never do it) to 5 (I 
would certainly do it). These situations are about small or big corruption and ask them in 
which measure they would accept this behaviour. At the same time in each situation, 
respondents have been asked by their belief about the possible behaviour of their contacts in 
these situations. It has been demonstrated that people lies when ask them about sensitive 
issues, and their answer about the behaviour of other people in the same situations 
represent more accurately their real attitude of respondents than the direct questions 
(Kanasawa, 2005).  
 
Hypothesis 1: Respondents are more critical and reluctant to corrupt practises if they 
respond by themselves that if they guess what people around them 
could respond. This behaviour could be for two reasons, or respondents 
believe that their contacts are more lax with this topic than themselves or 
they lie when respond for themselves and respond their really believes when 





Figure 1 Sample distribution by personal characteristics 
 



























































In the last part of the survey, respondents have been asked by real cases of corruption that 
appeared in the media, but without the names of people or organizations who staged such 
cases of corruption. The objective of this part is to find the grade of tolerance that citizens 
have about the cases of corruption. On a scale from 0 (totally unacceptable) to 5 (It's ok for 
me, I would too), they have to answer what degree of rejection will suggest the following 
scenarios.  
Hypothesis 2: People tend to condemn corruption practises differently, depending on 
who is involved. Corrupt acts of the first phase obtained higher scores than 
those of the second phase. It tends to criminalize in stronger way corrupt 
manners of third people than when we ourselves are involving in one amoral 
or corrupt procedure. Additionally, corrupt acts made by politicians are 
considered worse than those made by business or citizens. 
The purpose is exploring the possibility that people experiment differences in perception 
about corruption when these cases are from other people and reduce the importance when 
they are involved in one. Some reports and researchers claim that corrupt people have the 
same values than the other people and also criticize other cases of corruption, but when they 
involve on it, they justify their behaviour or they simply think that it isn’t a wrong thing. For 
this purpose the survey is divided in 2 parts: one part for direct potential corruption situations 
and the other, where corruption activity it has been done by third parties. It was sent two 
types of surveys, both with the same questions, but in different order in order to avoid 
possible order effects. Appendix 1 shows an example of the questions included in the survey. 
The next table (Table 1) provides a quick explanation of all variables used in the work and in 
the Table 2 appears the meaning of all dummy used.  
 
Variables Explanation 
Income Total salary received per year 
Sex Male or Female  
Family If respondent has family responsibilities 
Public School  If respondents have never studied in a public school 
Studies Maximum level of studies that respondents acquired 
Personal~ Mean of the first part valuations 
No personal  Mean of the second part valuations 
General~ Mean of the opinion about all types of corruption 
Corrupcion Politica~ Opinion about corruption in politics 
Corrupcion Empresarial~ Opinion about corruption in business 
Corrupcion ciudadanos~ Opinion about corruption in normal citizens' life 
~Propia  Direct personal opinion of respondents 
~Ajena What respondents believe about what their relatives could respond 
Table 1: Meaning of variables 
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Income Studies Public School Family Sex 
0€ - 9,000€ 0 Elementary 0 Yes 0 Yes 0 Male  0 
9,001€ - 18,000€ 1 Seconday 1 No 1 No 1 Female  1 
18,001€- 30,000€ 2 
Professional 
Training 2 
      30,001€- 50,000€ 3 University 3 
      50,000 € 4 PhD 4 
      Table 2 Dummy variables 
 
In the first part of the survey we included some personal characteristics to classify better the 
respondents. The purpose of this classification is both simply classify the respondents and 
find possible determinants that influence the corrupt behaviour. There are some studies that 
have found that corrupt behaviour can be influenced by some personal characteristics of 
individuals. For example it has already studied the influence that could have an economic 
background in the selfish behaviour of people10. Robert H. Frank et al. (1993) investigated if 
exposure to the self-interest model commonly used in economics alters the extent to which 
people behave in self-interested ways founding some evidence that differences in 
cooperativeness are caused in part by training in economics. Franck and Schulze (2000) 
made an experiment which isolates the influence of self-interested on cooperation from other 
influences, they found that economics students are significantly more corrupt than others but, 
contrary to the experiment of Frank, Gilovich & Regan, evidenced that this difference is due 
to self-selection rather than indoctrination. In other words economics students are not more 
self-interest because of indoctrination, but they opt by economic degrees because they are 
more self-interest.  
Age, sex or family charges can influence in our behaviour and all of them are tested. It has 
been tested by several studies that females have a more ethical behaviour or produce less 
corruption than males (Barr, Lindelow, & Serneels, 2009). Also higher social class can 
predict increased unethical behaviour (Paul K. Piffa, 2012). Following previous studies we 
want to check if personal characteristics have influence in the corrupt behaviour of people.  
Hypothesis 3: The perception about corruption depends on personal characteristics 
As we saw in other works, personal characteristics of people could be 
important. Sex, studies, family responsibilities…. Could affect our perception 
of corruption and we will check if this is true.  
                                               
10
 We have just explained two papers that research in this way, but there are more examples (Carter 
and Irons 1991; Frank, Gilovich , & Regan, 1996; Marwell and Ames, 1981). It could be interesting for 
further research to make another survey controlling by studies and contrast if the self-interest 
behaviour observed in different experiments is observed also in that survey.  
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 DATA ANALYSIS AND MAIN RESULTS 
 
In this part the three hypotheses that it has been stablished before will be tested. A simple 
glance of averages (Table 6) gives us the intuition, however this is not enough to determine 
whether there are significant differences in mean and therefore there is a real difference in 
our perception of corruption. To be sure that there are significant differences it was 
performed econometric analysis. It is compulsory that our data meet the assumption of 
normality, hence it was used two tests (Saphiro-Wilk and Saphiro-francia Table 7) to find 
evidence whether the distribution of our data follows a normal. Unfortunately data doesn’t 
follow a normal distribution so it can’t be used the most common econometric analysis, it 
must be used non parametric statistics.  
All variables used to test the first and the second hypotheses are dependent samples, hence, 
the Wilcoxon signed-rank test is the suitable method to do it (table 3 shows all the results 
obtained using this method). To test the first hypothesis, it has been used pairs of variables 
where the question was the same, but respondents had to answer on the one hand for their 
personal opinion and on the other hand for the possible opinion of their close contacts. The 
two tests reinforce our theory. In both it has rejected the null hypothesis that the average of 
both variables are the same and accept the alternative hypothesis that people are more 
critical and reluctant to corrupt acts if they respond by themselves that if they respond by 
people around them. People tend to be more critical and morally correct when expressing 
their personal opinion than when people predict the opinion of his closest contacts. This 
result can be given for two reasons. On one hand, because people tend to think that they are 
morally superior to their close contacts. On the other hand, it could be because they want to 
give the answer most accepted by society. 
Following the same procedure than before, it was studied the second Hypothesis which was 
divided in two subparts. On the one hand, it was tested if there are differences in the repulse 
of corruption that citizens have, depending on if this corruption procedure has been done by 
themselves or by third parties. For this purpose it was constructed a Wilcoxon signed-rank 
test for the variables Personalpropia and Nonpersonal. Again the Wilcoxon signed-rank test 
conducted reveals that our theory is true. The null hypothesis that in average both variables 
are the same was rejected and it was accepted the alternative hypothesis that the average of 
the first part (personal) is greater than the second part (no personal), in other words, people 
tend to condemn more corrupt activities when referring to third parties.  
Immediately after, the same test was run to check the second part of the hypothesis; Is every 
corrupt activity refused by the same intensity? The objective of this second part of the 
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Hypothesis 2 is to check if the population is more critical with political corruption than 
corruption performed by citizens or entrepreneurs. In order to look into this question, the 
averages of Corrupcionpolitica, Corrupcionempresarial y Corrupcionciudadanos were 
compared in the Table 5 and 6. Another time the null hypothesis was rejected in the four 
tests, hence the alternative hypothesis, which says that people tend to criticize more if the 
case of corruption is performed by politicians than if it is performed by citizens or 
businessman, was accepted. In other words, population tends to criminalize corruption with 
more emphasis when politicians are involved. 
 
Hypothesis Wilcoxon signed-rank test p-value 
1 
signtest General~Propia = General~Ajena 0,00 
signtest Personal~Propia = personal~Ajena 0,00 
2 
signtest Personal~Propia = Nopersonal 0,00 
signtest Corr.Politica~Propia = Corr.Emp.~Propia 0,00 
signtest Corr.Politica~Ajena = Corr.Emp.~Ajena 0,00 
signtest Corr.Politica~Propia = Corr.Ciuda.~Propia 0,00 
signtest Corr.Politica~Ajena = Corr.Ciud.~Ajena 0,00 
Table 3: Wilcoxon signed-rank tests
11
 for hypothesis 1 and 2 
 
In order to study third Hypothesis it was used the variable obtained in the second part 
(nopersonal). For this purpose it was used the Wilcoxon Mann-Whitney12 test (Table 4) for 
dichotomous variables (sex, PublicSchool and family) and the Kruskal-Wallis test (Table 5) 
for variables with more than two possibilities (age, Income and studies). 
 
Variables Sex PublicSchool Family 
Wilcoxon Mann-Whitney(z) 3.381 0.205 0.000 
p-value 0.0007 0.837 1 
Table 4: Wilcoxon Mann-Whitney for Sex, Publicschool and Family 
 
                                               
11
 The Wilcoxon signed-rank test is a non-parametric statistical hypothesis test used when comparing 
two related samples, matched samples, or repeated measurements on a single sample to assess 
whether their population mean ranks differ. It can be used as an alternative to the paired Student's t-
test, t-test for matched pairs, or the t-test for dependent samples when the population cannot be 
assumed to be normally distributed. 
12
 In statistics, the Mann–Whitney U test (also called the Mann–Whitney–Wilcoxon (MWW), Wilcoxon 
rank-sum test, or Wilcoxon–Mann–Whitney test) is a nonparametric test of the null hypothesis that is 
equally like a randomly selected value from one sample will be less than or greater than a randomly 
selected from from a second sample. Unlike the t-test it does not require the assumption of normal 
distributions. It is nearly as efficient as the t-test on normal distributions. 
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The tests show that the Sex is significant when we measure the perception of corruption but 
Public School and family have not effect. For the variables with more than two possibilities 
we use the Kruskal–Wallis13 test by ranks. Surprisingly, following the test results, neither 
income nor studies affect our perception of corruption, only age appears as significant. 
 
Variables Age Income Studies 
Kruskal–Wallis test by ranks (ꭓ2) 9.726 1.181 2.019 
Rank  [19-71] [0-4] [0-4] 
p-value 0.0453 0.7693 0.7323 





To make this paper possible a survey has been created to study different singularities about 
the opinion that citizens have about corruption. The objective is to analyse the coherence of 
respondents when they have to give their opinion about different situations where corruption 
appears. At the same time they also answer questions about some personal characteristic 
such as age, sex, or income. The goal of these questions is to find some determinants that 
make the people more or less permissive to corruption manners. The survey has been 
distributed by internet around the world using direct contacts and the contacts’ relatives. A 
sample of over 400 responses was obtained, reaching the initial objectives. Although the 
sample is large enough to perform all the studies that this paper presents, it is too localized 
in a few geographical areas. This limitation prevents us analyse if the geographical variable 
plays an important role in our way to envisage corruption. It remains for further studies to 
obtain a representative sample of different regions and countries. The sample of more than 
400 responses allows building more than 16 variables, of which it as only used 13 for our 
study. It was shown through the Shapiro–Wilk and Shapiro–Francia tests that variables are 
not normally distributed, so it has been necessary to use nonparametric statistics.  
                                               
13
 The Kruskal–Wallis test by ranks, Kruskal–Wallis H test (named after William Kruskal and W. Allen 
Wallis), or One-way ANOVA on ranks is a non-parametric method for testing whether samples 
originate from the same distribution. It is used for comparing two or more independent samples of 
equal or different sample sizes. It extends the Mann–Whitney U test when there are more than two 
groups. The parametric equivalent of the Kruskal-Wallis test is the one-way analysis of variance 
(ANOVA). A significant Kruskal-Wallis test indicates that at least one sample stochastically dominates 
one other sample. 
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The first result (table 3) shows that opinions given by respondents vary depending on if we 
ask them for their personal opinion or if we ask for their believe about their relatives opinion. 
When people were asked for their personal opinion on a morally reprehensible question, 
people tend to answer in a more ethical manner than they really think, and they use the 
question about what their close contacts think to answer what they effectively think14. 
Following this theory we must be very careful when conducting the survey. Although surveys 
are anonymous, when we ask citizens their personal opinion about a topic where there is an 
ethical standard, answers may be biased toward that standard; hence it would not reflect the 
real opinion of citizens. It would be interesting in future papers study more closely this effect 
and observe if the existing gap remains constant over studies. If the gap observed in this 
study remains constant, deviation it can be corrected in future surveys. It has been 
demonstrated that our perception and critique of corruption varies depending on if this 
corruption involves respondents or it has been made by third parties, being more criticized 
the corruption manners performed by third people. On the other hand, cases of corruption 
made by third parties are more or less criticized and condemned depending on whether they 
are made by politicians, businessmen or citizens. This fact could have very serious 
consequences when are conducted surveys of perceived corruption by citizens. We assume 
that cases of corruption that most people can see in the day to day, without the press or the 
courts bring it to light, are those that affect citizens and entrepreneurs. Corrupt acts 
committed by politicians go unnoticed by most citizens, only if these procedures arrive to 
mass media, citizens are aware of these practices. Hence, in a very corrupt system where 
the media are controlled by the policymakers or where, although there are cases of 
corruption, have not yet been discovered (as in Spain 5 years ago), citizens underestimate 
corruption in that country. And by the same reasoning, a country where the press and justice 
work reasonably well, more cases of political corruption will be discovered, and although the 
average citizen is not in direct contact with corrupt practices, the corruption perception of that 
country would be overestimated. Various international organizations, fight against corruption 
and periodically publish reports and indices of corruption by countries. These indexes should 
take into account the peculiarity about the perception of corruption that we have noted in this 
paper. If these indexes don’t have this factor in mind, the corruption of countries that operate 
freely and properly it could be overestimated and underestimated corruption in countries 
where freedoms are restricted and corruption is widespread. 
It is commonly accepted that some personal characteristics influence our decisions. In 
experiments of corruption has been seen that variables such as gender, age or education 
can affect our decisions in the game. The results presented in this paper, show that Sex and 
                                               
14
 This theory follows the work of Phillippa Lally et al (2011)“Social norms and diet in adolescents” 
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age are significant, but Income Public, family and studies not. This result follows the results 
obtained in other experiments where age and sex are significant, while income and studies 
are significant or not depend of the experiment. 
Graphical results were been obtained about the inconsistency of citizens in assessing 
corruption. First, in the survey, it is compulsory to know how to make the questions about 
corruption in order to obtain answers that fit well the reality, thereupon, we must not forget 
that depending on who has committed the crime of corruption, citizens rejection could vary. 
Finally, it seems that some personal characteristics could modify our way to view the 
corruption. From our point of view, this work should be repeated with new samples, reaching 
other regions of Spain and other countries to see if the same results are repeated. In that 
case, all surveys conducted to measure corruption in each country, must take into account 











Appendix 1: Survey description 
 
In the Appendix 1 it shows which kind of questions were included in the survey. It has only 
presented some questions of the English version to save space and doesn't make the paper 
repetitive. Survey was distributed in English, Spanish and French in order to arrive to the 
maximum number of people possible. It is important remember the order of the 
questionnaire, where the first part is called risk behaviour and the second part is called 
Corruption, it has been changed in order to obtain two different surveys to observe if exist 
order effect.  
 Personal characteristics 
In this section it was asked for personal information, such as nationality, Gender, Date of 
Birth, Educational Level, Annual Income or Age  in order to identify some characteristics of 
the respondents.  
 Risk behaviour 
The objective of this part is to measure willingness to commit corrupt acts by citizenship. In 
order to keep the environment neutral and without prejudices, it was not written the 
corruption word in any question. In the following lines you can read the introduction chapter 
paragraph and 3 examples of the questions that were included in this section.  
We want to analyse in depth the attitude of our society towards certain risky situations. In 
order to do this, we will introduce different situations, some more daily than others, which 
must respond on a scale from 0 (I'd never do it) to 5 (I would certainly do it). 
In the second row you must answer what you believe that other respondents of your 
environment would answer the same question.15 
- Now you are a successful footballer. Since you have dedicated your life to play football, you 
are not so familiar with tax issues. An Administrator has visited you and ensures that you can 
pay 30% less taxes, but he suggests that he could use shell companies in other countries. 
For peace of mind, he ensures you that only 1% of tax evasions come to discover. Would 
you hire this Administrator? 
                                               
15
 In this part of survey, in each question, respondents have to respond also at the following question: 
What do you believe that other respondents in your environment would respond? 
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- Imagine that you are responsible for awarding a construction in your municipality. There is a 
company dedicated to this type of buildings and other structures that has already done this 
type of buildings in other towns with good results. This company offers you a personal bonus 
of 2,500 € if you write the conditions of the award specifically for it. Knowing that the 
probability that someone contest the award is 5%. Will you write the conditions favouring this 
company? 
- It is time to pay taxes. You have already made some estimation and know that this year you 
will have to pay a large sum of money. A friend tells you that if you declare your second 
apartment as a primary residence can save 30% on your tax return. The likelihood that tax 
inspectors focus on your case and found this irregularity is 15%. Will you follow the advice of 
this friend? 
 Corruption 
The objective of this part is to measure the permissiveness of citizens about the cases of 
corruption did it by other people. Some of cases that we have represented in this part were 
appeared in the media. And the last 3 questions ask directly for the permissiveness about 
corruption of respondents.  In the following lines you can read the introduction chapter 
paragraph and 3 examples of the questions that we included in this section. 
In recent years, almost every day we see how new cases of corruption are reported by the 
media. We would like to know the degree of acceptance of our citizens to different types of 
corruption that we've seen in the news. 
On a scale from 0 (totally unacceptable) to 5 (It's ok for me, I would too), answer what degree 
of rejection will suggest the following scenarios. 
- A banker sells financial products to their customers, even though they are not suitable for 
them, in order to reach their productivity ratio and get more benefits. 
-. It has discovered a Swiss bank account of the prime minister, with money that large 
companies, which have benefited from recent public contracts, paid him as a bribe. 




                                               
16
 In the questions 8,9,10 respondents have to respond also at the following question: What do you 
believe that other respondents in your environment would respond? 
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Appendix 2: Main characteristics of the sample  
In Appendix 2 data are described in more detail. However, it was not included all the data 
that it was obtained. It could be tedious and too long include detailed descriptive of all 
variables. If for some reason you are interested to know all the specifications, please, send 
an email (al083935@uji.es) and it will be provided you all information that you need.  
Variable Mean Std.Dev Min Max 
Personal~Propia 1,18178 0,84076 0 5 
Personal~Ajena 2,26170 1,06832 0 5 
No Personal 0,81703 1,14285 0 5 
General~Propia 0,64363 0,94202 0 5 
General~Ajena 0,98200 1,03429 0 5 
Corr.Politica~Propia 0,33477 0,98489 0 5 
Corr.Politica~Ajena 0,64579 1,17195 0 5 
Corr.Empresarial~Propia 0,57883 1,10063 0 5 
Corr.Empresarial~Ajena 0,82073 1,22265 0 5 
Corr.Ciudadanos~Propia 1,10173 1,22242 0 5 
Corr.Ciudadanos~Ajena 1,47948 1,39232 0 5 
Table 6 Answers description 
Data is obtained by a sample with a 400 respondents. First to run different analysis it was 
tested if data follows a normal distribution. If data does not follow normal distribution, it must 
use non parametric analysis. To test the distribution of the variables, it was made the 
Shapiro–Wilk and Shapiro–Francia because both are valid for the sample and are commonly 
used in the literature.  
 
Shapiro-Wilk W test for normal data 
 Variable W V z Prob>z 
Personal~Propia 0.94619 16.957 6.782 0.00000 
Personal~Ajena 0.99367 1.994 1.654 0.04909 
No Personal 0.76502 74.049 10.314 0.00000 
General~Propia 0.77563 70.703 10.203 0.00000 
General~Ajena 0.89081 34.407 8.478 0.00000 
      
 
Shapiro-Francia W' test for nomal data  
 Variable W’ V’ z Prob>z 
Personal~Propia 0.95459 15.382 5.968 0.00001 
Personal~Ajena 0.99662 1.146 0.298 0.38298 
No Personal 0.78553 72.618 9.357 0.00001 
General~Propia 0.81096 64.007 9.081 0.00001 
General~Ajena 0.91065 30.253 7.445 0.00001 
Table 7 Tests for normality distribution of data 
In both tests it can be rejected the hypothesis that all variables are normally distributed, only 
in Saphiro-Francia is not possible reject that Personal Ajena is normally distributed. The 
values reported under W and W’ are the Shapiro –Wilk and Shapiro –Francia test statistics. 
The tests also report V and V’ , which are more appealing indexes for departure from 
normality. The median values of V and V’ are 1 for samples from normal populations. Large 




Phillippa Lally et al. (2011). Social norms and diet in adolescents. Appetite(57), 623–627. 
Alesina, A., & Zhuravskaya, E. (2011). Segregation and the Quality of Government in a 
Cross-Section of Countries . American Economic Review, 101(5), 1872-1911. 
Andersson, S., & Heywood, P. (2009). The Politics of Perception: Use and Abuse of 
Transparency International's Approach to Measuring Corruption. Political Studies, 57, 
746-767. 
Bäck, H., & Hadenius, A. (2008). Democracy and State Capacity: Exploring a J-shaped 
Relationship. Governance 21, 1-24. 
Barr, A., Lindelow, M., & Serneels, P. (2009). Corruption in Public Service Delivery: An 
Experimental Analysis. Journal of Economic Behaviour & Organization, 72, 225-239. 
Brioschi, C. (2010). Breve Historia de la Corrupción: de la Antiguedad a Nuestros Dias. 
Taurus. 
Brown, E., & Cloke, J. (2004). Neoliberal Reform, Governance and Corruption in the 
South:Assessing the International Anti-Corruption Crusade. Antipode, 2(36), 272-94. 
Canning, D., & Fay, M. (1993). The effect of Transportation Networks on Economic Growth. 
Columbia University. 
Centro de Investigaciones Sociologicas. (2016). Percepción de los Tres Principales 
Problemas de España.  
Charles L., T., & Hudson, M. (1972). World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators. Ann 
Arbor. 
Charron , N., & Lapuente, V. (2010). Does Democracy Produce Quality of Government? 
European Journal of Political Research(49), 443-470. 
Chong, A, De la O., A, Karlan, D, & Wantchekon. (2011). Looking Beyond the Incumbent: 
The Effects of Exposing Corruption on Electoral Outcomes. 
Daniel, T. (2002). Decentralization and the Quality of Government. Department of Political 
Science. 
Davis, J., & Ruhe, J. (2003). Perceptions of Country Corruption: Antecedents and Outcomes. 
Journal Business Ethics, 43, 275-288. 




Fisman, R., & Gatti, R. (2002). Decentralization and Corruption: Evidence Across Countries. 
Journal of Public Economics, 83(3), 325–345. 
Forte, A., Peirò, J., & Tortosa, E. (2015). Does Social Capital Matter for European Regional 
Growth? European Economic Review, 77, 47-64. 
Frank , B., & Schulze, G. (2000). Does Economics Make Citizens Corrupt? Journal of 
Economic Behaviour & Organization, 43, 101-113. 
Frank, R., Gilovich , T., & Regan, D. (1993). Does Studyng Economics Inhibit Cooperation? 
Journal of Economic Perspectives, 7(2), 159-171. 
Hofstede, G. (1980). Culture's Consequences: International Differences in Work-Releated 
Values. Sage Publications New York . 
Holmberg, R. (2009). Quality of Government: What you get? 12, 135-161. 
Huntington, S. P. (1968). Political Order in Changing Societies. Yale: Yale University. 
Jaber-Lopez, T. J., Garcia-Gallego, A., & Georgantzis, N. (2015). On the Emergence and 
Sustainability of Corruption: an Experimental Analysis. Universitat Jaume I. Tesis 
Doctoral, Repostori UJI. 
Jaber-López, T., Garcia-Gallego, A., Perakakis, P., & Georgantzis, N. (2014). Physiological 
and Behavioral Patterns of Corruption. Frontiers in Behavioural Neuroscience, 8. doi: 
10.3389/fnbeh.2014.00434. 
Kanasawa, S. (2005). Who Lies on Surveys, and What Can We do About It? The Journal of 
Social, Political, and Economic Studies, 30, 361-370. 
Knack, S. (2002). Social Capital and the Quality of Government: Evidence from the States. 
American Journal of Political Science, 46, 772-785. 
Kurer, O. (2005). Corruption: An Alternative Approach to Its Definition and Measurement. 
Political Studies Association, 53, 222-239. 
La Porta, R. (1999). The Quality of Government. (O. U. Press, Ed.) The Journal of Law, 
Economics & Organization, 15(1), 222-238. 
Leff, N. (1964). Economic Development through Bureaucratic Corruption. The American 
Behavioral Scientist, 8(3), 8-14. 
Levine, R., & Renelt, D. (1992). A Sensirivity Analysis of Cross-Country Growth Regressions. 
American Economic Review, 82(4), 942-963. 
25 
 
Mankiw, N., Romer, R., & Weil, D. (1992). A Contribution to the Empirics of Economic 
Growth. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 107, 407-437. 
Mauro, P. (1995). Corruption and Growth. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 110(3), 681-
712. 
Miller, W. (2006). Corruption and Corruptibility. World Development, 34(2), 371-380. 
Ministerio de Educación Cultura y Deporte. (2016). Las Cifras de la Educación en España. 




Montinola, G., & Jackman, R. (n.d.). Sources of Corruption: A Cross-Country Study. British 
Journal of Political Science, 32, 147–170. 
Moro, r., & Freidin , E. (2012). Experimental Studies on Curruption and the External Validity 
Problem. 
Paul K. Piffa, D. M.-D. (2012). Higher Social Class Predicts Increased. Psychological and 
cognitives scinces, 109(11). 
Peiró, J., & Tortosa , E. (2013). Can Trust Effects on Development Be Generalized? A 
Response by Quantile. European Journal of Political Economy, 32, 377-390. 
Pilar Sorribes et al. (2015). Corruption: Magnitude, Causes and Consequences. Institut 
d'Economia de Barcelona. 
Rothstein, B. (2003). Social Capital, Economic Growth and Quality of Government: The 
Causal Mechanism. New Political Economy, 8(1), 49-71. 
Rothstein, B., & Stolle, D. (2007). The Quality of Government and Social Capital: A Theory of 
Political Institutions and Generalized Trust. The Quality of Government Institute. 
Rothstein, B., & Teorell , J. (2008). What Is Quality of Government? A Theory of Impartial 
Government Institutions. (B. Publishing, Ed.) Governance: An International Journal of 
Policy, Administration, and Institutions, 21(2), 165-190. 




Sollé-Ollé, & Navarro, S. (2014). Does Corruption Erode Trust in Government? Evidence 
from a Recent Surge of Local Scandals in Spain. (U. d. Barcelona, Ed.) Institut 
d'Economía de Barcelona, 26. 
Sosa Escudero, W. (2006, 09). Oocities. Retrieved from 
http://www.oocities.org/econometriaavanzada/QuantileClaseBeamer1.pdf 
Transparency International. (2006). Retrieved from 
http://www.transparency.org/news_room/faq/faq_ti 
Transparency International. (2016). Retrieved July 2016, from 
http://www.transparency.org/what-is-corruption/#define 
Treisman, D. (2000). The Causes of Corruption: A Cross-National Study. Journal of Public 
Economics, 399–457. 
Universidad Nacional de Colombia. (n.d.). Econometria Avanzada. Retrieved from 
http://www.econometriaavanzada.com/mmisasarango/quantile.pdf 
Urra, F. (2007). Assessing Corruption an Analitical Review of Corruption Measurement and 
its Problems: Perception, Error and Utility. 
World Bank. (2001). The World Bank. Retrieved from http://www.worldbank.org/ 
World Economic Forum. (n.d.). The Global Competitiveness Report 2014–2015. Retrieved 
from World Economic Forum: http://reports.weforum.org/global-competitiveness-
report-2014-2015/view/methodology/ 
 
 
